ASEAN’s Pathfinder Multilateralism and Principled Pragmatism: Navigating Trump World Order and Great Power Rivalry in Southeast Asia

Author: Jeff Leong, PhD Candidate in International Law and Regional Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University (2023-2027); Chair, LAWASIA Corporate, Securities and Investment Law Committee; Co-Chair, LAWASIA Belt and Road Initiative Committee; and Senior Partner, Jeff Leong Poon & Wong (Malaysia)

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Southeast Asia stands as one of the world’s fastest-growing regions and a vital hub for manufacturing, services, and supply chains. Professor Selina Ho of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy notes that ASEAN states actively seek the simultaneous presence of both the United States and China. They treat China as an essential economic partner through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, while viewing the US as a key security guarantor and major source of foreign direct investment. Regional perceptions of China remain mixed: governments welcome economic gains but harbour deep concerns over sovereignty, as illustrated by Laos’ heavy infrastructure dependencies.¹

The stakes have risen sharply with the rise of what educator Jiang Xueqin calls the “Trump World Order.” In his April 2026 lecture, Jiang describes Trump’s transactional overhaul of the post-1991 order. Trump ends perceived US subsidisation of global security and trade, treats allies more extractively, reduces direct military commitments in East Asia, and pursues North American resource self-sufficiency. The 2026 Iran war, launched as Operation Epic Fury with US-Israeli strikes, triggered Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This disruption halted roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil and LNG—80–90% bound for Asia—and produced the worst energy shock since the 1970s. Southeast Asian nations now ration fuel, declare energy emergencies (as in the Philippines), and face soaring prices, while US allies Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines feel acute pressure under “Fortress America” retrenchment.²

Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong confronted these realities head-on at the Boao Forum for Asia on 26 March 2026. He warned that the Middle East conflict drives up food and energy prices, disrupts supply chains, and risks a global slowdown. Wong noted that multilateral agreements have become extremely difficult in a fractured world, yet ASEAN cannot wait for universal consensus. He advocated flexible plurilateral arrangements among smaller groups of like-minded partners that move faster, test ideas, set standards, and deliver results. These open frameworks complement rather than replace the multilateral system and serve as building blocks for resilience. Wong highlighted RCEP, CPTPP, and the upgraded ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement as practical examples and urged deeper ASEAN-China cooperation in trade and energy transition, including support for the ASEAN Power Grid.³

ASEAN responds to the Trump World Order through two complementary strategies. Pathfinder multilateralism, as Danny Quah describes it, involves pioneering agile, rules-based coalitions of the willing in a “G-minus world” where great-power consensus has eroded. Principled pragmatism blends adherence to core “ASEAN Way” norms—sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus—with adaptive, interest-driven diplomacy. Scholars in international law and regional governance view this approach as a hybrid model: it draws on formal international legal principles (such as UNCLOS in the South China Sea) while relying on informal regional practices of consultation and consensus-building, creating a resilient governance architecture suited to a fragmented global order.⁴

This approach echoes the “values-based realism” that Finnish President Alexander Stubb articulated and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney explicitly adopted in his January 2026 Davos speech: principled commitment to international rules paired with pragmatic recognition of power realities.⁵

ASEAN centrality, enshrined in the 2008 Charter and the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, anchors this strategy. The grouping positions itself as the region’s agenda-setter and promotes an inclusive, open Indo-Pacific that rejects zero-sum rivalry. Regional elites identify strongly with ASEAN, which amplifies the voice of smaller states through collective action.⁶

In practice, principled pragmatism drives hedging and strategic multi-alignment. ASEAN members deepen economic ties with China while diversifying security links with the US, Japan, and others. They advance Code of Conduct negotiations in the South China Sea through multilateral forums while avoiding escalation. Amid the Iran-induced oil crisis and Trump’s “Fortress America” retrenchment—marked by homeland-focused defence and reciprocal tariffs—ASEAN accelerates diversification. It strengthens the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a buffer against US tariffs, pushes higher standards in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and expands the upgraded ASEAN-China FTA in green and digital sectors. ASEAN also pursues direct Gulf energy diplomacy through ASEAN-GCC and trilateral ASEAN-China-GCC channels, joint stockpiling under the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, and rerouted supply chains.⁷

Pathfinder initiatives further insulate the region. The Lao-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore power integration project demonstrates feasible cross-border energy cooperation. ASEAN engages BRICS platforms (with Indonesia as a full member) for South-South leverage and supports mediation efforts to restore Hormuz flows, complementing Oman-led diplomacy. These functional minilaterals on energy, climate, and technology build collective resilience without forcing binary alignments.⁸

China’s civilizational renewal, UN fidelity, and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) fit neatly into ASEAN’s framework. Through the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI, 2023), Beijing promotes civilizational diversity, mutual learning, and renewal of its 5,000-year heritage as a model of modernization rooted in tradition rather than Western imitation. The Global Governance Initiative (announced in 2025) complements this by reaffirming fidelity to the UN Charter, sovereign equality, and international law without double standards, while calling for reform of global institutions to better serve developing nations. ASEAN leaders, including Wong at Boao, welcome these initiatives pragmatically: they align with the ASEAN Way’s emphasis on non-interference and consensus, offer economic and developmental public goods, and provide space for pathfinder-style cooperation without demanding ideological alignment. Interdisciplinary analyses of international law and regional governance highlight this synergy—China’s initiatives reinforce multilateral legal norms at the global level while ASEAN operationalises them regionally through flexible, interest-based coalitions.⁹

ASEAN faces real challenges. Consensus decision-making can produce lowest-common-denominator outcomes, while economic disparities and crises such as South China Sea militarisation and Myanmar test unity. Yet the current shocks underscore the model’s value. Wong pledged that Singapore, as ASEAN Chair in 2027, will deepen regional integration and keep the grouping open and connected.¹⁰

ASEAN’s pathfinder multilateralism and principled pragmatism equip smaller states with agency in a transactional, multipolar era. By forging open coalitions, calibrating norms to realities, securing diversified energy flows, deepening pragmatic partnerships with China (including on the ASEAN Power Grid), and engaging China’s civilizational and governance initiatives on ASEAN’s own terms, the grouping navigates the Trump World Order and great-power rivalry. This adaptive approach offers a practical blueprint for stability and prosperity in a fragmenting global order.

Keywords: ASEAN centrality, pathfinder multilateralism, principled pragmatism, Trump World Order, US-China rivalry, Fortress America, Iran-Hormuz crisis, Lawrence Wong Boao speech, RCEP, CPTPP, ASEAN-China relations, Global Governance Initiative, values-based realism, regional resilience.

Endnotes

¹ Selina Ho (interviewed), ‘This is How ASEAN Manages Great Power Rivalry’ (Foreseeable / The Front Row Podcast, April 2026).

² Jiang Xueqin, ‘Game Theory #18: Trump World Order’ (Predictive History lecture, 2 April 2026).

³ Lawrence Wong, ‘Speech at the Opening Plenary of the 2026 Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference’ (Boao, 26 March 2026) <https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/pm-lawrence-wong-at-the-2026-bo-ao-forum-for-asia–bfa–annual-conference/> accessed 4 April 2026.

⁴ Danny Quah, ‘Third Nations Can Piece Together a Ruptured World Order’ (East Asia Forum, 13 March 2026) <https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/03/13/third-nations-can-piece-together-a-ruptured-world-order/> accessed 4 April 2026; Amira Athira Azman and Sameer Kumar, ‘ASEAN’s Principled Pragmatism and the Evolving Normative Security Strategy on the South China Sea’ (2018) 4(1) *AEI Insights* 33.

⁵ Mark Carney, ‘Principled and Pragmatic: Canada’s Path’ (Davos speech, 20 January 2026), citing Alexander Stubb’s “values-based realism”.

⁶ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN Charter* (2008) art 2; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* (23 June 2019).

⁷ ‘China and ASEAN Sign Expanded Free Trade Pact’ *AP News* (28 October 2025); ASEAN Centre for Energy, ‘ACE on the Situation in the Middle East and the Impact on ASEAN Energy Security’ (9 March 2026).

⁸ OECD/IEA, *Establishing Multilateral Power Trade in ASEAN* (OECD 2019).

⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative’ (1 September 2025) <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html> accessed 4 April 2026.

¹⁰ Lawrence Wong, ‘Speech at the Opening Plenary of the 2026 Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference’ (Boao, 26 March 2026).

Bibliography

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN Charter* (2008).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* (23 June 2019).

Azman AA and Kumar S, ‘ASEAN’s Principled Pragmatism and the Evolving Normative Security Strategy on the South China Sea’ (2018) 4(1) *AEI Insights* 33.

Carney M, ‘Principled and Pragmatic: Canada’s Path’ (Davos, 20 January 2026).

Ho S (interviewed), ‘This is How ASEAN Manages Great Power Rivalry’ (Foreseeable / The Front Row Podcast, April 2026).

Jiang X, ‘Game Theory #18: Trump World Order’ (Predictive History, 2 April 2026).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative’ (1 September 2025).

Quah D, ‘Third Nations Can Piece Together a Ruptured World Order’ (*East Asia Forum*, 13 March 2026).

Wong L, ‘Speech at the Opening Plenary of the 2026 Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference’ (Boao, 26 March 2026).

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