Reclaiming the UN Charter in a Post-Rupture World

Abstract

Observers frequently describe the international rules-based order as dead, ruptured or under severe strain. Recent events illustrate the point. Yet the UN Charter itself remains fully intact and binding on all 193 Member States. No state has withdrawn from it. What has ruptured is not the universal legal framework but the version long dominated by Western powers. Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine, Israel’s policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the United States’ military operation in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 that captured President Nicolás Maduro, and the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have exposed the limits of selective enforcement. These developments invite a measured response. The Global Majority — the more than 150 developing and non-aligned states — now possesses the numerical responsibility, demographic weight, and growing capabilities to help guide the Charter-based order forward. With the West as an active partner, shared leadership can renew the multilateral system in a manner that honours its founding ideals of equality, justice, and peaceful cooperation. Scholars such as Kishore Mahbubani, Danny Quah, George Yeo, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Amitav Acharya have long anticipated this shift and offer practical guidance for navigating it.

Introduction

The UN Charter endures as the foundational treaty of modern international relations. Adopted in 1945, it prohibits the threat or use of force against any state’s territorial integrity or political independence and affirms the sovereign equality of all members.1 Recent crises test these principles but do not erase them.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney captured the prevailing sentiment in his January 2026 address at Davos when he spoke of a “rupture, not a transition” in which geopolitics now appears “submitted to no limits, no constraints.”2

Kishore Mahbubani, a leading voice from Singapore, has argued for years that the world is moving from a unipolar, uni-civilisational order to a genuinely multipolar and multi-civilisational one.3

Danny Quah highlights the economic drivers behind this change, noting that the centre of global economic gravity has shifted eastward and that multilateralism must adapt or risk fragmentation.4

George Yeo, former Singapore Foreign Minister, observed as early as 2008 that international institutions like the United Nations function best when they accept the emerging multipolar reality.5

Western scholars have reached similar conclusions. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a prominent American international lawyer and former US State Department official, calls on middle powers to take the lead in rebuilding multilateralism through flexible coalitions that include both established and emerging states.6

Amitav Acharya, a leading scholar of global international relations, describes the emerging system as a “multiplex world” in which multiple actors exercise agency without any single hegemon dominating.7

Their collective insights remain relevant.

The Charter was never intended as the exclusive property of any group of states. It belongs to all. The West, with its historic commitment to the rule of law and human dignity, now has an opportunity to partner with the Global Majority in strengthening it.

The Charter Remains the Enduring Foundation

The Charter’s core provisions continue to guide state behaviour. Article 2(4) sets the prohibition on the use of force. Article 2(1) enshrines sovereign equality. Article 33 requires peaceful settlement of disputes. These obligations apply equally to every member.1

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the ongoing conflict have drawn consistent international attention. On 24 February 2026, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/ES-11/L.17 by 107 votes to 12, with 51 abstentions. The resolution demands an immediate ceasefire, the release of unlawfully detained persons, and the return of deported civilians and children. It reaffirms Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in explicit reliance on the Charter.8

In the Middle East, the International Court of Justice delivered two important advisory opinions. In July 2024 it declared Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory unlawful. On 22 October 2025 it clarified Israel’s obligations as an occupying power toward the United Nations and other organisations in the territory, including the duty to facilitate humanitarian aid and respect UN privileges under Article 105.9 Israel continues to engage with UN processes despite expressing reservations.

The United States’ actions in early 2026 intensified the sense of rupture. On 3 January 2026, US forces captured President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.10 On 28 February 2026, joint US-Israeli strikes killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.11 Neither operation received Security Council authorisation. Commentators across the spectrum have noted the precedent these events set.

Yet states still invoke the Charter. The General Assembly acts when the Security Council is deadlocked. The International Court of Justice continues its work. The 2024 Pact for the Future, adopted by consensus, reaffirms the Charter as the centre of global cooperation and commits states to reform within its framework.12

The Charter Was Always Meant for All Nations

The Charter’s universal character was evident from its drafting. Its 51 original signatories came from every region. Decolonisation expanded membership to 193 and embedded principles of self-determination and equality more deeply. Mahbubani reminds us that the West played a proud role in creating this document but that its principles draw from multiple civilisations.3

Today the Global Majority represents most of humanity. These states consistently support core Charter norms in General Assembly voting. Their economic weight has grown dramatically. Quah’s research shows that Asia and the Global South now drive global growth, making inclusive governance not merely fair but necessary for stability.4

The Case for Shared Leadership

Shared leadership by the Global Majority and the West offers a path forward. This is not replacement but partnership. The West’s defence of democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law gives it moral authority to help shape a more representative system. By joining this effort, Western nations can demonstrate that their commitment to fairness and justice extends to the evolving global reality.

Mahbubani has long urged the West to recognise that “the rest” now form the majority and that stable order requires their full participation.3 Slaughter specifically advocates for middle powers — many from the Global Majority and traditional Western allies — to convene the UN General Assembly elsewhere if needed and build overlapping coalitions that restore accountability and effectiveness.6

Quah argues that economic integration once pulled the world together; today it can still do so if institutions adapt to new centres of power.4

Acharya’s “multiplex world” framework shows how diverse actors can cooperate without hegemony, giving the Global Majority legitimate agency alongside Western partners.7

Such adaptation reduces perceptions of double standards and builds broader legitimacy. History shows that inclusive orders prove more resilient and generate greater shared prosperity.

Addressing Concerns About Power and Realism

Some observers worry that majority leadership overlooks hard power realities. These concerns merit serious attention. Yet unilateral actions also carry costs — diplomatic isolation, economic friction, and diminished influence — even for the strongest states. The Venezuela and Iran operations of 2026 triggered renewed calls for reform from traditional allies.

In a multipolar world, legitimate institutions help manage competition. Yeo noted that global leadership now requires a “new concert of big powers” beyond the traditional few.5 The Charter already supplies the framework. Expanding the Security Council, using the General Assembly more effectively, and strengthening the International Court of Justice integrate real capabilities while preserving stability. The Global Majority brings not only numbers but growing economic and diplomatic influence. When rising powers help shape the rules, they invest in upholding them.

Cohesion within the majority is stronger than often assumed. On issues of sovereignty and non-intervention, voting unity regularly reaches 75–85 per cent. Platforms such as BRICS demonstrate practical coordination. The West’s experience in institution-building can help translate this energy into durable progress.

Practical Steps Forward

Progress lies within the Charter’s existing mechanisms. The UN80 reform process provides a timely opportunity to expand Security Council membership with fair representation for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The General Assembly can continue to act through the Uniting for Peace procedure and request advisory opinions on systemic questions. Financial institutions can evolve through transparent dialogue to reflect current economic realities.

The 2025 BRICS Rio de Janeiro Declaration explicitly calls for Security Council reform to amplify Global South voices and strengthen multilateralism.13 Coordination among the Global Majority will complement Western engagement. The goal is partnership: Western innovation and values working alongside the perspectives and capabilities of the wider world.

A Shared Future

Recent strains have tested the international system. They also open a path to renewal. The UN Charter remains the one document that all nations accept as the foundation of global order. The Global Majority stands ready to help lead in a spirit of inclusion and shared responsibility.

The West, with its proud tradition of advancing liberty and justice, can choose to participate as a vital partner. In doing so, it will honour the moral vision that helped create the Charter and secure a more stable and prosperous world for its own citizens and for all humanity.

The rupture need not divide us. With wisdom and goodwill, it can draw us closer in a stronger, fairer multilateral order. The opportunity lies before us. The Charter awaits our collective stewardship.

#PostRuptureWorldOrder #IR #InternationalLaw #BRICS #GlobalGovernance #Law #InternationalRelations #UN #UnitedNations #Geopolitics #UNCharter #Multipolar

Footnotes

¹ Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 2(1), 2(4), 33.
² Mark Carney, Special Address (World Economic Forum, Davos, 20 January 2026).
³ Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Interview – Kishore Mahbubani’ (E-International Relations, 15 October 2025).
⁴ Danny Quah, ‘Resilience through cooperation: With or without multilateral consensus’ (31 March 2025).
⁵ George Yeo, Speech at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (30 September 2008).
⁶ Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘What’s Next for Multilateralism?’ Project Syndicate (3 October 2025).
⁷ Amitav Acharya, ‘Multipolar or Multiplex? Interaction Capacity, Global Cooperation and World Order’ (2024).
⁸ UNGA Res A/ES-11/L.17 (24 February 2026) ‘Support for lasting peace in Ukraine’.
⁹ International Court of Justice, Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion, 22 October 2025).
¹⁰ Wikipedia, ‘2026 United States intervention in Venezuela’ (updated 8 March 2026).
¹¹ Reuters, ‘US-Israeli strikes on Iran kill Supreme Leader Khamenei’ (28 February 2026).
¹² United Nations General Assembly, Pact for the Future UN Doc A/RES/79/1 (22 September 2024).
¹³ BRICS, Rio de Janeiro Declaration: Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance (6 July 2025).

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