John Rawls ranks among the most influential political philosophers of the 20th century in the Anglo-American tradition. His seminal work, A Theory of Justice, revives the social contract tradition from Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Rawls portrays society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.1
Rawls connects profoundly to the Western liberal order, especially the post-World War II egalitarian liberalism in North America and Western Europe. He delivers a moral and philosophical justification for liberal welfare-state capitalism. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls sets out two core principles of justice in lexical order.
The first principle ensures each person enjoys an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with similar schemes for others. This emphasises classic liberal freedoms. The second principle permits social and economic inequalities only if they attach to positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity and serve the greatest benefit of the least advantaged—the difference principle.2
This structure equips post-war centre-left liberalism with its most rigorous philosophical defence. It integrates strong individual rights, market economies, significant redistribution, and priority for the worst-off. It justifies mixed economies, welfare states, progressive taxation, and social safety nets that shaped the Western liberal order from the 1950s to the 1980s. These features continue to influence centre-left parties. Many commentators view A Theory of Justice as the clearest expression of the moral ideals that underpinned 20th-century Anglo-American welfare-state liberalism.3
Rawls recognises a critical limitation in his own framework. The original position and veil of ignorance fit the basic structure of a single, closed domestic society most effectively. Parties select principles without knowledge of their personal circumstances for one cooperative scheme among citizens pursuing their conceptions of the good under shared institutions. This arrangement produces robust egalitarian outcomes: equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle.4
Cosmopolitan critics such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge contend that the model translates poorly to the international domain. No thickly cooperative global basic structure exists—no world government or comprehensive redistribution mechanism. States vary enormously in size, resources, cultures, and levels of development. Parties would not rationally choose strong global redistribution; they would dread representing poor or small peoples forced to bear heavy transfers. The veil presumes mutual benefit within a closed system, whereas international cooperation stays thinner, more voluntary, and oriented toward coexistence rather than deep egalitarian sharing.5
Rawls refuses to extend the full veil globally to individuals. Such an extension would mandate cosmopolitan redistribution to equalise life chances worldwide—an result he deems unrealistic and incompatible with the autonomy of peoples. He frames justice between peoples as a distinct, second application of contractarian reasoning, separate from domestic justice.6
This recognition drives Rawls to pursue a distinct method in The Law of Peoples. He deploys a modified original position for representatives of peoples, not individuals. The veil of ignorance becomes thinner: parties understand they represent a people with shared sympathies, territory, government, and conception of justice, but they remain ignorant of specifics such as size, population, wealth, military power, or natural resources. The principles that emerge prove modest and state-centric:
- Peoples maintain freedom and independence.
- Peoples observe treaties and agreements.
- Peoples hold equality as parties to the original position.
- Peoples practise non-aggression except in self-defence.
- Peoples honour a limited set of human rights (life, freedom from slavery or serfdom, personal security, some rule of law).
- Peoples assist burdened societies to achieve well-ordered status, without indefinite redistribution.
- Peoples respect restrictions in war.
- Peoples honour the Law of Peoples.7
This approach accommodates decent hierarchical peoples—non-liberal yet non-aggressive societies that respect basic human rights, employ consultation mechanisms rather than full democracy, and advance a common-good conception of justice. It excludes aggressive outlaw states and severely burdened societies that require aid to reach decency.8
Individual rights receive indirect safeguards. Well-ordered peoples (liberal or decent) must uphold a concise list of basic human rights—no genocide, slavery, or systematic oppression, plus elements of political participation and religious toleration in decent peoples. These protections fall short of the comprehensive liberal entitlements in domestic justice. Decent peoples may retain consultation hierarchies and state religions provided basic rights remain intact. No global difference principle operates, and the primary moral unit persists as the people, not the individual.9
In Political Liberalism, Rawls confronts reasonable pluralism in mature democracies—profound, intractable disagreements concerning religion, comprehensive philosophies, and conceptions of the good life. He formulates political liberalism: legitimate political power must rest on public reason that all reasonable citizens can accept, without dependence on any single comprehensive doctrine. This fosters state neutrality regarding ultimate values while securing basic rights and fair procedures. It constitutes the prevailing philosophical rationale for liberal democracies navigating religious, cultural, and moral diversity.10
The Law of Peoples extends this logic internationally. Rawls outlines a peaceful society of liberal and decent peoples. This vision aligns with—but adopts a more restrained form than—the post-1945 liberal international order, encompassing human rights, international law, democratic peace, and tolerance toward non-aggressive non-liberal societies.11
Rawls’s pivot to a peoples-centred framework in global justice exhibits partial resemblance to certain Asian traditions, particularly those influenced by Confucianism. These traditions stress community, harmony (he), consensus, and the collective good above unrestrained individualism. Rawls elevates collective units—peoples—as the chief moral agents in international relations. He permits decent non-liberal hierarchies to preserve stability and pursues peaceful coexistence through mutual respect, without mandating full liberal democracy. This stance parallels “Asian values” arguments that favour social harmony, stability, family and community duties, and non-adversarial governance over Western-style individual rights and competitive democracy. Comparative political philosophers highlight these structural affinities.12
The distinction between individual rights and community harmony proves fundamental. Western liberal traditions treat individuals as autonomous, rights-bearing agents whose entitlements—inherent freedoms like speech, religion, association, and equality—precede society and protect against arbitrary power. Society exists to secure individual flourishing, with conflicts resolved through adversarial claims and legal mechanisms.13
By contrast, Confucian-influenced East Asian thought views the self as relational and embedded in hierarchical networks of family, community, and state. Moral realisation occurs through duties (li), benevolence (ren), and role fulfilment. Harmony (he er bu tong—harmony without uniformity) ranks as the supreme good: relational balance, consensus, and collective stability take precedence over individual assertions. Aggressive rights claims disrupt harmony; duties to the group condition personal entitlements. The state maintains order through moral example and mutual obligations rather than rights enforcement.14
Internationally, this asymmetry intensifies. Asian states often prioritise collective stability, sovereignty, and relational harmony over universal individual rights enforcement. Non-interference becomes central to preserving interstate harmony: criticising domestic rights abuses risks confrontation and relational disruption. “Asian values” discourse historically justified prioritising economic development and social order over civil/political rights when the latter threatened stability.15 In diplomacy, consensus mechanisms (e.g., ASEAN) avoid open conflict, even if delaying individual justice claims. Harmony trumps maximalist rights internationally because it enables coexistence in a diverse, multipolar world amid power asymmetries—focusing on relational stability and sovereignty first.16
Differences endure: Rawls’s framework remains liberal, enforcing a thin floor of individual human rights for decency. It rejects thick perfectionism. Toleration derives from Western pragmatic pluralism, not intrinsic harmony valuation.17
In the post-rupture world order—fractured by challenges to the post-Cold War liberal consensus—cooperation requires drawing from diverse civilisations. Asian values offer strengths in community orientation, consensus-building, and relational stability. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 Davos speech powerfully articulates this imperative. Carney declares the rules-based international order in “rupture, not transition.” Invoking Václav Havel’s greengrocer—who displays “Workers of the world, unite!” not from belief but to signal compliance and avoid trouble—Carney urges middle powers to “take the sign out of the window”: name reality openly, abandon performative compliance with a fading fiction, reject nostalgia, isolation, or zero-sum retreats, and engage pragmatically.18
Carney advocates “principled pragmatism” or “values-based realism”: commitment to fundamental values (sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression except per UN Charter, human rights) combined with recognition that progress is incremental, interests diverge, and partners may not share all values. Middle powers must build issue-by-issue coalitions, act consistently, strengthen domestic resilience against coercion, and preserve sovereignty—engaging the world as it is, without ideological rigidity.19
Carney’s non-ideological stance—pragmatic engagement across divides—resonates with Rawls’s emphasis on overlapping consensus, toleration of decent non-liberal peoples, and pluralism over universal imposition. Both prioritise minimal shared principles for peaceful coexistence amid deep differences. In a multipolar era of great-power rivalry and eroded norms, Rawls’s framework, echoed in Carney’s call for principled yet pragmatic cross-civilisational cooperation, supplies tools for stability without cultural hegemony or forced uniformity.20
Bibliography
Ames RT, ‘The Confucian Worldview: Uncommon Assumptions, Common Misconceptions’ in Ames RT and Rosemont Jr H (eds), “Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary” (University of Hawai’i Press 2011).
Barr MD, ‘Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian Values” Debate’ (2000) 24 Asian Studies Review 309.
Beitz CR, “Political Theory and International Relations” (Princeton University Press 1979).
Brown C, ‘The Construction of a “Realistic Utopia”: John Rawls and International Political Theory’ (2002) 28 Review of International Studies 5.
Carney M, ‘Principled and Pragmatic: Canada’s Path’ (Prime Minister of Canada, 20 January 2026) <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses>.
Cline EM, ‘Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism, Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy’ (2007) 6 Dao 361.
Confucius, “The Analects” (Lau DC tr, Penguin Classics 1979).
Hoon CY, ‘Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity’ (2004) 32 Indonesian Quarterly 154.
Kim S, ‘Public Reason Confucianism: A Construction’ (2015) 109 American Political Science Review 187.
Li C, ‘The Confucian Concept of Harmony’ (2006) 1 Philosophy Compass 549.
Li C, ‘The Philosophy of Harmony in Classical Confucianism’ (2008) 3 Philosophy East and West 475.
Mahathir M and Ishihara S, “The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century” (Kodansha International 1995).
Pogge TW, “Realizing Rawls” (Cornell University Press 1989).
Rana KS, ‘Asian Diplomacy: Harmony and Contrast’ (2019) Emerging Diplomat Analyst Insight <https://kishanrana.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EDA-Insight-AsianDip.pdf>.
Rawls J, “A Theory of Justice” (Harvard University Press 1971, revised edn 1999).
Rawls J, “Political Liberalism” (Columbia University Press 1993, expanded edn 2005).
Rawls J, “The Law of Peoples” (Harvard University Press 1999).
Wenar L, ‘John Rawls’, in Edward N Zalta (ed), “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Winter 2023 edn, substantive revision September 2025) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/>.
West J, ‘Can Asian Countries Live Together in Peace and Harmony?’ in “Asian Century… on a Knife-edge” (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) ch 10.
Wu X(A), ‘The Rise of China’s Harmony-Oriented Diplomacy’ (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 2007) <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/rise-chinas-harmony-oriented-diplomacy>.
Footnotes
1 Rawls (n 15) preface.
2 Ibid 53–65, 266–67.
3 Wenar (n 18).
4 Rawls (n 15) 118–68.
5 Beitz (n 3); Pogge (n 13).
6 Rawls (n 17) 23–30, 115–21.
7 Ibid 37.
8 Ibid 59–88.
9 Ibid 65–80.
10 Rawls (n 16) xviii–xxvii, 212–54.
11 Rawls (n 17) 1–23.
12 Cline (n 6); Kim (n 9); Li (n 10).
13 Wenar (n 18).
14 Confucius (n 7); Li (n 11); Ames (n 1).
15 Barr (n 2); Hoon (n 8); Mahathir and Ishihara (n 12).
16 Rana (n 14); West (n 19); Wu (n 20).
17 Rawls (n 17) 59–60.
18 Carney (n 5); drawing on Václav Havel, ‘The Power of the Powerless’ (1978).
19 Ibid; CBC and other coverage of the speech.
20 Brown (n 4); author’s extension based on Rawls (n 17) 1–23 and Carney (n 5); see also Wenar (n 18) s 7.
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