Introduction
Harold Hongju Koh’s transnational legal process theory explains why nations obey international law in a decentralised world.^1 Koh argues that obedience arises not primarily from coercion or short-term rational calculation, but from a repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalisation. Transnational actors—governments, courts, NGOs, corporations, and individuals—engage in fora where they interpret norms, then internalise those norms into domestic law, institutions, and identity. This process makes compliance “sticky” over time, even without a central enforcer.^2
Koh’s framework blends constructivist insights (norms shape identity) with institutionalist emphasis on repeated games.^3 He famously declared that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law… almost all of the time.”^4 Critics, however, question whether this optimistic model survives in an era of rising great-power competition, unilateralism, and overt violations of core norms such as the prohibition on the use of force (UN Charter, art 2(4)) and humanitarian law.
Recent events in 2025–2026 test the theory sharply: the prolonged humanitarian crisis in Gaza amid blockade and aid restrictions; the United States’ abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026; renewed US threats to acquire Greenland from Denmark, including refusal to rule out force until a partial back-down; and the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran launched in late February 2026, which killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and pursued regime change. These cases involve powerful states flouting sovereignty, humanitarian obligations, and territorial integrity. Do they prove transnational legal process dead, or merely dormant under extreme stress?
The Gaza Humanitarian Crisis: Partial Internalisation Amid Power Asymmetry
Israel maintains a blockade on Gaza that severely restricts humanitarian aid, exacerbating famine risks and malnutrition.^5 UN agencies and NGOs document deliberate impediments to aid delivery, including closures of crossings like Rafah and Kerem Shalom, especially after escalation tied to the Iran conflict.^6 The International Court of Justice issued provisional measures in South Africa v Israel (2024 onward) ordering prevention of genocide and unimpeded aid, yet compliance remains limited.^7
Transnational legal process operates partially here. NGOs, UN bodies, and domestic courts interact vigorously; global media and protests interpret norms of international humanitarian law (Geneva Conventions) and the right to life; some internalisation occurs through Israeli court challenges and occasional aid increases.^8 Yet power asymmetry prevails: Israel justifies restrictions on security grounds, and enforcement lacks teeth. The process generates pressure and episodic compliance (e.g., temporary ration deliveries), but fails to halt the crisis. This pattern shows the theory alive in normative discourse, but weakened when a state perceives existential threats.
The Abduction of Nicolás Maduro: Sovereignty Violation with Limited Backlash
On 3 January 2026, US forces conducted “Operation Resolve,” striking targets in Caracas and abducting President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores.^9 The US transferred them to New York for prosecution on drug and terrorism charges.^10 Venezuela and allies condemned the act as kidnapping and violation of sovereignty under the UN Charter.^11
Koh’s model predicts backlash through transnational interaction: UN Security Council debates, protests in Caracas and New York, and condemnation from China, Russia, and Latin American states.^12 Interpretation occurs via legal framing (e.g., Chatham House analysis labels it an unlawful abduction).^13 Yet internalisation stalls. The US justifies the operation as enforcement against narco-terrorism, bypassing extradition norms.^14 Domestic US support and limited allied sanctions blunt reputational costs. The episode reveals transnational legal process at work in mobilising opposition, but ineffective against a superpower that internalises exceptions for itself.
The Greenland “Grab”: Threats Against Territorial Integrity
Since late 2024, President Trump revived demands to purchase or control Greenland, refusing to rule out military force until a January 2026 Davos speech.^15 Threats included 25% tariffs on EU goods unless Denmark ceded the territory.^16 Denmark and Greenland rejected the demands, citing sovereignty and self-determination.^17
Interaction unfolded rapidly: NATO consultations, European condemnations, and media framing the threats as imperial.^18 Interpretation invoked Article 2(4) and historical US-Danish agreements.^19 Trump later backed off force and claimed a “framework” deal, suggesting reputational and alliance costs prompted partial retreat.^20 Here, transnational legal process constrains escalation: allied pushback and domestic/international shaming force de-escalation, illustrating “stickiness” even against bold unilateralism.
The Iran War: Regime Change Through Force and Normative Erosion
On 28 February 2026, US-Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear, missile, and leadership sites, killing Supreme Leader Khamenei.^21 Officials framed the campaign as preventing nuclear breakout and achieving regime change.^22 Iran retaliated with missiles, but suffered heavy losses.^23
This operation breaches Article 2(4) absent clear self-defence under Article 51.^24 Interaction occurs: UN debates, condemnations from Global South states, and calls for ceasefire.^25 Interpretation labels the strikes unlawful aggression and assassination.^26 Internalisation fails spectacularly: the US and Israel proceed despite backlash, echoing earlier regime-change interventions (Iraq 2003). Power trumps process here. Yet long-term seeds exist—global shaming may constrain future actions and embolden Iranian opposition or successors.
Conclusion: Not Dead, but Severely Strained
These crises do not kill transnational legal process; they expose its limits. In regulatory, low-stakes domains (trade, environment), the cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalisation produces high compliance.^27 In high-stakes security crises involving powerful states, realism dominates: might overrides right, and process generates pressure without decisive restraint.
Koh’s theory remains relevant because it explains episodic compliance, reputational costs, and long-term norm evolution. Gaza sees partial aid flows from shaming; Greenland threats de-escalate under alliance pressure; even Maduro’s abduction sparks normative condemnation that may deter copycats. The Iran war inflicts the deepest wound, reviving unilateral regime change and eroding Charter norms.
Transnational legal process endures as a descriptive and prescriptive tool. It thrives where interdependence binds states and weakens where power asymmetries prevail. To revive it, actors must strengthen transnational networks—NGOs, courts, alliances—and raise defection costs through sustained interaction and interpretation.
The theory lives, bruised but breathing.
Bibliography
Koh HH, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 Yale LJ 2599.
Koh HH, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 97 Mich L Rev 1838 (earlier formulation).
Henkin L, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Columbia UP 1979).
International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures) Order of 26 January 2024 https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192 accessed 7 March 2026.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel: Aid Groups Barred From Gaza, West Bank’ (24 February 2026) https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/24/israel-aid-groups-barred-from-gaza-west-bank accessed 7 March 2026.
Al Jazeera, ‘UN chief warns of Israeli-made humanitarian crisis in Gaza amid war on Iran’ (3 March 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/un-chief-warns-of-israeli-made-humanitarian-crisis-in-gaza-amid-war-on-iran accessed 7 March 2026.
CNN, ‘January 3, 2026 — Maduro in US custody’ (4 January 2026) https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/venezuela-explosions-caracas-intl-hnk-01-03-26 accessed 7 March 2026.
Chatham House, ‘The US capture of President Nicolás Maduro – and attacks on Venezuela – have no justification in international law’ (4 January 2026) https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/us-capture-president-nicolas-maduro-and-attacks-venezuela-have-no-justification accessed 7 March 2026.
CNN, ‘The US has tried to acquire Greenland before – and failed’ (7 January 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/07/politics/us-greenland-trump-denmark-history-hnk accessed 7 March 2026.
Politico, ‘Trump steps back from the brink on Greenland. But the damage has been done’ (21 January 2026) https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/21/trump-greenland-military-deal-00739427 accessed 7 March 2026.
Reuters, ‘US-Israeli strikes kill Khamenei and Iranian retaliation’ (1 March 2026) https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-crisis-live-explosions-tehran-israel-announces-strike-2026-02-28 accessed 7 March 2026.
Al Jazeera, ‘As bombing continues, Israel’s war aim in Iran becomes clear: regime change’ (3 March 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/as-bombing-continues-israels-war-aim-in-iran-becomes-clear-regime-change accessed 7 March 2026.
^1 Koh HH, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 Yale LJ 2599, 2645–2659.
^2 Ibid 2656–2658.
^3 Koh HH, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 97 Mich L Rev 1838.
^4 Henkin L, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Columbia UP 1979) 47 (quoted approvingly in Koh (n 1) 2600).
^5 Human Rights Watch (n 5).
^6 Al Jazeera (n 6).
^7 International Court of Justice (n 4).
^8 ReliefWeb and UNRWA reports note episodic improvements.
^9 CNN (n 7).
^10 Ibid.
^11 Al Jazeera (n 6) (cross-referenced condemnation context).
^12 UNSC emergency meetings referenced.
^13 Chatham House (n 8).
^14 US justifications in indictments.
^15 CNN (n 9).
^16 Ibid.
^17 Danish and Greenland statements.
^18 European reactions.
^19 Politico (n 10).
^20 Ibid.
^21 Reuters (n 11).
^22 Al Jazeera (n 12).
^23 Ibid.
^24 UN Charter arts 2(4), 51.
^25 Global South condemnations.
^26 Academic and media framing.
^27 Koh (n 1) passim.
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